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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING FROM A
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Nether Providence, Pennsylvania, is a first-class township in the
greater Philadelphia area; it has an area of 4.64 square miles and a
population of approximately 13,000 people. The township is residen-
tial in character and consists largely of single-family homes. Although
there are provisions for apartments in several of the surrounding com-
munities, the zoning ordinance in Nether Providence, which contains
residential, commercial, and industrial zones, fails to provide for apart-
ments anywhere in the township. In Appeal of Girsh,1 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court declared this total exclusion 2 of apartments
unconstitutional.
In 1964 Girsh contracted to purchase a 17 acre tract of land in
Nether Providence, known as the Duer Tract. The land is located
next to a commuter line of the Penn Central Railroad and within
six-tenths of a mile of two of the township's main roads. The land is
well wooded, is crossed by two streams, contains a swampy area, sev-
eral large outcroppings of rock, and rapid changes in land elevation.3
Several past planning studies had recommended to the township that
it include apartments in its zoning plan and, because of its location
and topography, that the Duer Tract be included in these districts.
The township refused.4
Girsh, however, wanted to build two high-rise, luxury apartments
on the land and requested that the board rezone the land. When it
1. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
2. Although there were already apartments in two locations in the township, and
apartments could be built after a variance was secured, the court says that the
difficulty in proving the degree of hardship necessary to sustain an application for
a variance makes this ordinance "the legal equivalent of an explicit total pro-
hibition of apartment houses . . . ." Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397. Since the
court treats this ordinance as a prohibition of apartments, I shall do the same.
There are courts, however, which would not equate an ordinance which makes no
provision for a land use, but allows the use by means of variance, with a total
prohibition of the use. See, e.g., High Meadows Park, Inc., v. City of Aurora, 112
Ill. App. 2d 220, 250 N.E.2d 517 (1969); Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough
of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 515, 64 A.2d 347, 351 (1949).
3. Brief for Appellant at 4, Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
4. Id. at 6.
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refused, Girsh went to court to have the ordinance declared unconsti-
tutional. The trial court upheld the ordinance, but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nether Providence "cannot
have a zoning scheme that makes no reasonable provision for apart-
ment uses."5
Looking at the history of zoning cases, it can be seen that prior to
1949, courts decided zoning cases as if a municipality were a self-con-
tained, isolated unit. "Traditional concepts of zoning," said Judge
Stewart in Valley View Village, Inc., v. ProffettP "envision a munici-
pality as a self-contained community with its own residential, business
and industrial areas."7 Courts looked at the land use in question only
as it was appropriate to that particular municipality without regard
to whether that location was appropriate in view of the way the re-
gion was developing.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8 foreshadowed a more re-
gional aspect for viewing zoning cases when the court noted "the
possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far out-
weigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way." 9 But it was not until Duffcon
Concrete Products v. Borough of CresskillO that a court changed its
approach to zoning cases and looked beyond the municipality's borders
to the entire region in deciding if the defendant municipality was
acting reasonably in excluding a particular land use from its bounda-
ries.
Duffcon involved a municipality of a residential character which
had made no provision for heavy industry in its zoning plan. The
plaintiff wanted to use his land for production of concrete blocks and
challenged the validity of the ordinance. In deciding that the exclu-
sion of heavy industry from the municipality was valid, the court
took note of the fact that the borough was residential in nature and
that there was extensive bottom land in the region available for in-
dustry. In striking language the court in Duffcon set a precedent for
approaching zoning cases on a regional basis:
5. 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
6. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
7. Id. at 418.
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Id. at 390.
10. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
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What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property
depends not only on all the conditions, physical, economic and
social, prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present
and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of the entire
region in which the municipality is located and the use to which
the land in that region has been or may be put most advanta-
geously. The effective development of a region should not and
cannot be made to depend upon the adventitious location of
municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or even centuries
ago.... The direction of growth of residential areas on the one
hand and of industrial concentration on the other refuses to be
governed by such artificial lines.'1 (Emphasis added)
At first those interested in land use planning considered the Duffcon
view a boon to regional planning, and many courts followed the
Duffcon reasoning when considering the validity of total exclusions
of a land use from a municipality. 2 But, upon reflection, many writers
began to see problems with this method of resolving exclusion cases.
In his book, The Zoning Game, Babcock says that cases like Duffcon
and Valley View, "where the words of the opinion suggest a repudia-
tion of the equation of general welfare with the municipality [result],
ironically, in just the reverse."1 3 In other words, the very cases which
seem to aid regional planning actually retard it and reinforce the
traditional view of looking only to the municipality to determine
the suitability of a particular land use. What Babcock means may
become more clear when some of the problems with this regional
approach are examined.
One of these problems lies in the ad hoc nature of judicial review.
When the court reviews a municipal zoning ordinance to determine
the validity of a land use exclusion, it has before it only the evidence
provided by the parties in that particular case, and it is quite con-
ceivable that "a court might be led [to hold the exclusion valid] by
convincing evidence that land for these uses is provided in an ad-
jacent municipality, even though that municipality's allocation may
be sufficient to satisfy only its own needs."'14 This problem can be-
11. Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50.
12. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962);
Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrough Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958);
Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (App.
Div. 1951); Struyk v. Samuel Braen's Sons, 17 N.J. Super. 1, 85 A.2d 279 (App.
Div. 1951); Appeal of Mutual Supply Co., 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951).
13. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 178 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BABcocK].
14. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107,
117.
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come even more complex when several small suburban communities
in an area totally exclude apartments from their boundaries; and
then, when each community is brought to court to test the validity
of its ordinance, the community points to the central city and argues
that since apartments are allowed and provided for in the core city, it
need not provide for them in its zoning scheme.S If the courts are
convinced by this argument, and several suburbs are successful in
defending their exclusions, apartment dwellers will be forced to re-
main in the crowded central city or congregate in the few municipali-
ties which do allow apartments within their boundaries, and, thereby,
cause an overburdening of the service facilities of those municipalities.
A related problem can arise in developing areas where each new
community passes zoning ordinances which exclude certain "undesir-
able" land uses such as apartments, mobile homes, or heavy industry
with the excuse that such land uses are permitted in the surrounding
unincorporated and un-zoned areas. This can result in a "contest
between municipalities to see who could avoid being the last to ex-
clude and hence the most vulnerable to attack."' 0
In Girsh the court seems to have been aware of these problems, for
it notes that:
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done
on a regional basis, so that a given community would have apart-
ments, while an adjoining community would not. But as long
as we allow zoning to be done community by community, it is
intolerable to allow one municipality (or many municipalities)
to close its doors at the expense of surrounding communities and
the central city.Y
From this language it appears that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has completely dosed the door to regional zoning at the judicial level.
That is, it has precluded any attempt to look beyond municipal
boundaries to see if a particular land use is appropriate for the
municipality (as the New Jersey court did in Duffcon) .11 At the same
15. Id. at 117-18 n.33.
16. BAcooc at 182.
17. 437 Pa. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d at 399 n.4.
18. It is possible, even probable, that the court will limit this view to situations
where there are total exclusions of certain land uses, and, maybe, to situations
where the exclusions are of certain residential land uses. This is evidenced by tho
court's opinion which declares that
[Mt is not true that the logical result of our holding today is that a munic-
ipality must provide for all types of land use. This case deals with the right of
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time, the court seems to be advocating regional planning at the legis-
lative level to prevent a race between the municipalities of an area to
keep from "being the last to exclude."
Had the deision in Girsh been framed in a manner that would
cause the townships of the area to fear losing effective local land use
control, negotiations might have followed which would have led to a
legislative decision on a regional policy for the location of apartments
in the area.19 As Babcock said, "[T]he court [which] could not plan
for the region.., could compel regional criteria as the only alterna-
tive to total loss of control over the particular development."20
One approach that would give the townships of the area reason to
fear losing control of local land use decisions would be to uphold the
ordinance as a whole, but to declare it invalid as applied to the plain-
tiff's land and allow the plaintiff to proceed with his proposed develop-
ment.2' This would put the townships on notice that if they did not
people to live on land, a very different problem than whether... [a munic-
ipality] must allow certain industrial uses within its borders. Id. at 245-46,
263 A.2d at 399.
19. BARcocx at 182-83.
20. Id. at 183.
21. Courts in Illinois have used this approach in recent decisions, but have not
been as restrictive in their use of regional criteria for determining the validity of
the ordinance as applied to the plantiff's land as is advocated in this paper. See,
e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d
406 (1960); High Meadows Park, Inc., v. City of Aurora, 112 Ill. App. 2d 220,
250 N.E.2d 517 (1969); Mangel & Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 115 Ill. App. 2d
383, 253 N.E.2d 9 (1969). Most courts are reluctant to look to see if a zoning
ordinance has been properly applied as to a specific plaintiff's land. They feel that
this is a legislative function and, in lieu of flagrant and arbitrary use of discretion,
will not review or overturn a zoning board's decision and institute a new zoning
classification for fear of being a "super-zoner." See, e.g., Robinson v. City of
Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957). But when there is a
municipality-wide exclusion of a particular land use, it does not seem to be an
usurpation of the legislative function to do as the Illinois courts have done and
look to see if the land use proposed by the plaintiff (the one excluded by the
municipality) is the most appropriate and, in some cases, the only feasible land use
for that particular property.
The argument against the court's being a "super-zoner" is based on the premise
that it has insufficient fact gathering capabilities. This is not true when the court
is considering only one land site, one land use, and has all the facts concerning
that site and proposed use before it. It is a no more difficult question to decide
than any other question the court, as the final arbiter, must decide. When the
court applied this approach in Mangel, it noted that "[t]he trial court is not to
perform as a zoning board, but may, at most, allow a specific use upon which a
petitioner is relying [and should cast its decision] 'in terms of the reasonableness of
excluding that specific use.'" 115 Ill. App. 2d at 395, 253 N.E.2d at 15.
Recent Michigan cases have taken a similar approach to the problem-they have
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plan for apartment uses, they would be leaving their ordinances open
to review by the court without regard to regional development.
Instead, the court in Girsh merely declared the ordinance as a whole
invalid.22 Nether Providence has subsequently circumvented the im-
pact of the decision by zoning a quarry for apartment use.23 Any hope
the court might have toward forcing regional planning at the legisla-
tive level was, thereby, thwarted. The approach the court used will
also cost Girsh and plaintiffs like him the time and expense of reliti-
gation to determine the validity of the ordinance as it applies to his
land.
Babcock says that the power to force municipalities to zone on a
regional basis at the legislative level lies in the courts;24 if this is true,
it appears that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court missed a good oppor-
tunity to apply that force in Appeal of Girsh.
Edwin L. Lyon
enjoined the municipality from interfering with the plaintiff's proposed use of the
land. See, e.g., Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 176 N.W.2d 598
(1970); Lacy v. City of Warren, 7 Mich. App. 105, 151 N.W.2d 245 (1967). In
Daraban the court declared a single-family residential classification invalid as ap-
plied to the plaintiff's lots, and, in the absence of any request by the municipality
for time to rezone, enjoined the municipality from preventing the plaintiff's erec-
tion of apartments on his property in accordance with the specific proposal pre-
sented to the court by the plaintiff. 383 Mich. at 500, 176 N.W.2d at 599.
22. Recent Pennsylvania decisions have shown a preference for determining the
constitutionality of the ordinance as a whole before looking at it as it applies to
the plaintiff's land. See, e.g., Exton Quarries, Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Ammon R. Smith Auto Co. Appeal, 423 Pa.
493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966).
23. Strong, Girsh and Kit-Mar: An Unlikely Route to Equal Opportunity in
Housing, 22 ZONING DIGEST 100a (1970). Other townships in the area have also
noted the weakness in the Girsh decision and "are looking for small, equally un-
suitable locations [for apartments]." Id.
24. BABcocx at 176.
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